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Abstract
This paper, largely written in the mid-1950s, appraises
the implications of the policies followed by the first
Labour Government from 1935 to 1949 and the National
Government that succeeded it between 1949 and 1957.
They were fortunate that, through most of the period,
favourable market conditions prevailed, especially in
Britain, for New Zealand’s major pastoral exports. This
provided a good basis for the expansion of the volume
of goods and services available for a rapidly growing
population. The emphasis of policy was on full
employment, – it was an era of considerable shortage
of labour – on redistribution through monetary benefits,
free education and health services and state housing,
and on a regulated stabilisation policy aiming at “fair
shares” among producers. The paper discusses the
implementation of these policies and their effects on
the rate and pattern of growth and on the capacity of the
New Zealand economy to develop in the less favourable
external environment that was emerging.
Foreword
Some may consider that it is either brave or foolhardy
to resurrect a piece of work, previously unpublished,
that was written early in my teaching career in late 1956
or early 1957. It was to have been a chapter in a book
that a group of staff members at Victoria University
College had undertaken to produce for the New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs. It was to be a successor
to a valuable study of Contemporary New Zealand
published by the Institute in 1938. Unfortunately, one
of our members, Winston Monk, was killed in an air
crash in 1954. For this and other reasons, the project
foundered and I became involved in a number of other
research, teaching, advisory and administrative
responsibilities.
Having found my draft while culling old papers, I
showed it to a few economic historians. They have
encouraged me at least to put it on the web, with only
slight modifications, for the edification of those
interested in this period of the country’s policy history.
The primary object of this essay was to attempt a
critical assessment of the major economic developments
that had taken place, and of the economic policies that
had been adopted, in New Zealand during the period
since ‘Contemporary New Zealand’ had been written
in 1938. I also wrote another chapter on New Zealand
in the World Economy. I have since published this
on the website of the Institute of Policy Studies as
Policy Paper 18.
Introduction
Critically assessing a country’s economic development
and the policies of its Government is, unfortunately, no
easier than attempting to judge whether a man has made
a success or a failure of his life. The major difficulty, in
both cases, is that there is no single criterion on which
judgment may be based.
Welfare is not just a matter of gaining command over
more and better material goods and services each year,
although most of us consider this a good thing. In
their political activities during the late 1930s and up to
the mid 1950s, the New Zealand people made it clear
that they were concerned with many other things.
The demand for security – security of employment
and security against disastrous loss of income through
ill health, old age, or changing overseas prices – was
a major factor governing the policies adopted by
both main parties.
Governments were also forced to concern them-
selves with the provision of adequate housing and health
and education services for all, with hours and conditions
of work and with the state of industrial relations.
They felt responsible for ensuring that adequate
provision was made for future generations, for protecting
the country’s external reserves, for maintaining
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reasonable stability of prices and for providing some
security against external aggression. And, in all their
policies, they had to remember that most New
Zealanders preferred the kind of community where
they could choose their own way of living without too
much interference from a higher authority.
Since Governments had to heed all these aspirations,
and others, it would be unreasonable for us to ignore
them in assessing what happened.
Unfortunately, our aspirations are not always
consistent with one another, in that if we pay too much
attention to achieving one of them, we often frustrate
the achievement of others. Since we cannot achieve all
our aspirations simultaneously, there will always be
disagreement as to how far each of them should be
pursued – disagreement springing from differences of
opinion on the relative values of the many components
of welfare. An essay like this, which tried to asses
whether development had been ‘balanced’ and policies
‘correct’, inevitably reflected the value judgments of
the author. I hoped that enough information was given
to enable readers to apply their own value judgments
to the author’s evaluation of thedevelopments and
policies discussed.
The Growth of the
New Zealand Economy
Probably the most remarkable feature of the period
which we are considering was the extent to which the
New Zealand people were able simultaneously and
successfully to pursue so many of the above objectives.
Although they did not achieve the millennium that was
said by extreme Socialists and by Social Crediters to be
within their grasp, Governments of both parties were
able to carry through, without serious misfortune,
policies which according to the more conservative
members of the community, were potentially disastrous.
a) Growth of the Volume of Goods
and Services Available
The volume of goods and services available to the people
of New Zealand increased substantially during our
period. There is no completely satisfactory way of
measuring the extent of the increase. Figures published
by the Department of Statistics indicate that the volume
of goods available for use in the year ended June 1955
was 88% greater, and that the average for the five years
ending June 1955 was 61% greater, than in the year
ended June 1939. The national income figures give a
more comprehensive picture, in that an assessment is
made of the value of services, as well as of goods,
available. In money terms, New Zealand’s gross national
income at market prices rose from £231 million in 1938-
39 to £982 million in 1955-56. But this increase was
due only partly to a rise in the volume of goods and
services available. It was mainly caused by a rise in
prices. An attempt, necessarily rough, has been made to
allow for the rise in prices which occurred, and the
results indicate that the volume of goods and services
available almost doubled between 1938-39 and 1955-
56, and increased by about 75% between 1938-39 and
the average of the six years ending March 1951-56.
b) Growing Population
The increased volume of goods and services available
had to be shared among a growing number of people.
In the late 1930’s, concern was being expressed at the
slow rate of growth of the New Zealand population. For
instance, it was pointed out in ‘Contemporary New
Zealand’ that the population would not maintain itself
unless the birth-rate rose markedly or substantial
immigration took place. The net reproduction rate was
only 0.967 in 1936.
In fact, the birth rate rose from about 1.6% of the
population in 1935 to about 2.5% of the population in
1956. The death rate rose slightly, and New Zealand
could no longer claim in 1956, as it could in the late
1930s, that it had the second lowest death-rate in the
world. Now not only the Netherlands, but also Israel, the
European population of South Africa, Denmark and
Canada preceded us. But natural increase had increased
substantially from 0.95% of the population in the 1930s
to about 1.7% in 1955-56.
In comparison with the 1930s, there had also been a
substantially increased net inflow of immigrants into
New Zealand after the war. A relatively small, but
generally increasing, proportion of immigrants intending
permanent residence were helped to come to New Zealand
by the government under an assisted passage scheme
which had been virtually in abeyance for 20 years. But
immigration had provided only a small proportion of the
total increase. At its peak in 1951 and 1952, the average
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annual net inflow was about 18,800 or 0.96% of the
mean population. Thereafter, the proportion declined
markedly, with the average net annual inflow being
only 0.41% of the mean population in the three
years 1954 to 1956. As the immigrants had been
predominantly British and Dutch, and those assisted
had been fairly carefully selected, there had been little
or no difficulty in assimilating them to the homogeneous
New Zealand pattern.
Very few other countries exceeded New Zealand’s
average rate of population increase in the first ten years
after the war of about 2.3% per annum. It is difficult to
decide whether this should be regarded as a creditable
achievement or not. New Zealanders shared high and
rising living standards with an increased number of
immigrants. However this was not the argument for
immigration that was most frequently heard.
Many proponents of rapid population increase
argued that it was urgently necessary to people the
country’s “empty spaces” with immigrants who would
(to quote a late Labour Prime Minister) ‘appreciate this
country, its democracy and its standards of living’. But
no conceivable increase could have greatly reduced
the relative attractiveness of New Zealand to a
potential aggressor or greatly increase her relative
capacity to defend herself. Those who contended that
immigration would assist in solving the labour
shortage that confronted New Zealand after the war
were proved wrong, in the short run at least.
Immigration, added to existing natural increase,
aggravated inflationary pressure, and thus intensified
the demand for labour, by stimulating an already high
demand for capital works and equipment of all kinds.
This, of course, provides no real argument against
immigration as such – many effective contributions to
development are likely to aggravate inflation in the
short run. From an economic point of view, a decision
on the desirability of rapid population increase should
rest on its effects on levels of living. One of the
country’s leading economists,1 Horace Belshaw,
argued that real income per head would grow more
rapidly with a slower rate of increase of population.
His theoretical arguments in support of this contention
were convincing, given his assumptions. But they
were not conclusive. One could not, with available
information, tell whether he had been too
pessimistic about the economies of scale that the
economy might derive from a larger population or
assess what effect higher immigration and more
rapid population increase might have had in
stimulating innovations that would not be made in a
more static economy.
c) Growth of consumption and
investment per head of population
New Zealand was able to keep the available supply of
goods and services comfortably ahead of the rise of
population. From the available statistics, it would
appear that the volume of goods and services available
rose by over 90% between 1938-39 and 1955-56 or
by about 50% per head of population.
The volume of goods and services consumed directly
by private individuals increased approximately in step
with the total volume of goods and services available.
The volume of goods and services taken up by the
government in providing its varied services to the
community also increased, but at 65%, the rise was
considerably less than proportionate to the increase in
total goods and services available. The most spectacular
advances had been in private investment. There was a
190% increase in the real resources devoted to
housing, factory and office building, machinery,
equipment and other kinds of capital in the period.
Government investment, on the other hand, showed
the lowest proportionate increase of all major
categories of expenditure. Comparing the six years
1951-56 with 1938-39, government outlay on capital
works in real terms would seem merely to have kept
pace with the growth of population.
Overall the community, while enjoying a
substantial increase in its level of consumption, had
been able to devote much greater proportion of its
resources than before the war to investment in capital
of all kinds. Gross capital formation, including changes
in stocks, had averaged nearly a quarter of New
Zealand’s gross national product. The percentage of
gross national product spent on capital formation in
New Zealand in the mid-1950s bore favourable
comparison with that of Australia. It was significantly
greater than the percentages prevailing in Canada, the
United Kingdom and the United States. We leave
until later a discussion of the favourable external
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circumstances that had been heavily responsible for
the progress made and of the question of balance
among various kinds of activity in the economy.
The Pursuit of Security and Stability
The stresses of the depression of the 1930’s strengthened
a conviction, already embodied half-heartedly in the
country’s legislation, that the Government should assure
the individual of much greater security than he had
enjoyed in the past against severe cuts in his real income
due to unemployment, sickness, accident or old age. The
convincing majorities given to the Labour Party in l935
and 1938 showed clearly how responsive the majority
of the people were at that time to a programme which
held out the prospect of security, as of right, against
poverty and which argued that the measures taken to
achieve this end would, at the same time, by raising the
people’s purchasing power and creating work, draw
forth a greater supply of goods and services to be shared
among them.
There were six main strands in the Labour Party’s
policy for security. The measures taken to implement
them influenced economic development in New Zealand
considerably throughout our period. The Government
was determined first, to achieve and sustain full
employment of labour; secondly, to guarantee to primary
producers prices which would assure them of a
“reasonable” standard of living, irrespective of market
prices for their products; thirdly, to raise wages to an
adequate level and protect them by legislation; fourthly
to increase monetary benefits for the aged, the sick, the
incapacitated and those with children; fifthly, to provide
from public funds free education and health services of
a high standard, and to ensure an adequate supply of
housing primarily by constructing large numbers of
state houses for letting at low rentals; and sixthly, to
ensure that the above measures were not frustrated by
undue increases in the prices of goods and services
which they regarded as basic essentials. We must
therefore briefly survey the methods adopted to approach
these objectives and study the results.
a) Full Employment
In 1936, shortly after the Labour Party had been elected
to office, there were estimated to be about 57,000 men
fully or partly unemployed or in subsidized work.
The new Government set out to rectify this situation
in three main ways: first, by increasing purchasing
power in the hands of the people through the
restoration and increase of wages and farm incomes
and through higher monetary benefits of various
kinds; secondly, by embarking on a more ambitious
public works programme than that undertaken by their
predecessors and, in particular, by the construction of
state rental houses on a large scale; and thirdly, by
promoting the development of secondary industry in
New Zealand, not merely to create employment in the
short run, but also in the hope that they could thus
reduce New Zealand’s dependence on exports of
pastoral produce. At first, primary emphasis was
placed on the first two methods of approach, and
on ensuring that increasing supplies of credit were
made available to the private sector at relatively low
rates of interest.
Initially the Government continued to finance
the bulk of its own increasing expenditures by
taxation (their revenues growing automatically with the
return of prosperity) and by limited borrowing from the
public. In 1938, however, it was forced to have
substantial recourse to the Central Bank to cover
growing commitments. In the same year, as a result of
a combination of growing imports stimulated by
economic expansion, a recession of export receipts
and an outflow of capital, the net overseas assets of the
New Zealand banking system fell to the dangerously
low level of £7 1/2 million.
To meet this situation, comprehensive import and
exchange controls were introduced in December, 1938.
The Government, in its 1935 election programme, had
intimated that some system of this kind would be an
essential part of their employment policy, but they had
apparently been unable to obtain the agreement of the
British authorities to its introduction. The 1938 crisis
was, therefore, (as James Thorn puts it in his biography
of Peter Fraser) ‘not altogether unfortunate from the
viewpoint of Labour Party policy’. The controls were
thereafter used to give substantial protection to local
industries deemed essential by the Government, by at
least restricting to determined quantities, and sometimes
by totally excluding, competitive imported goods.
Even in 1939, there were still 19,000 people fully or
partly unemployed or in subsidized work. However the
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heavy demands of the war soon removed this pool of
unemployed. This initiated an era of labour shortage that
persisted for many years. For example, the average
number of men registered as disengaged and seeking
work did not rise above 92 in any year between 1947
and 1955. Even with the slight tightening of the labour
market in 1956, the average number in this category was
only about 260 – a negligible proportion of a labour
force of about 815,000. As against this, the monthly
average of notified vacancies remained consistently
above 20,000 from 1947 to 1951. At its lowest, in 1953,
the average was 11,400. In 1956, it was about 13,000.
This ‘over-full employment’ continued in the post-
war period without any necessity for positive action by
the Government, although the financial policies of both
Governments contributed to it. In addition, both
Governments were inclined to pay considerable
attention to the dangers of unemployment in particular
industries, even ludicrously small ones, regardless of
the buoyancy of the overall employment situation.
This is a major reason why the National Government,
pledged to abolish quantitative import restrictions, felt
bound to retain a hard core of those introduced by the
Labour Government for protective purposes. Against
the obvious advantages that accrued to the community
from the much fuller use of its labour resources in the
past decade, must be set certain drawbacks that
inevitably arise in a situation of such acute labour
shortage. The most notable were a high turnover of
labour, delays on relatively essential projects through
lack of labour, slackness and inefficiency in many
workplaces and competitive bidding up of wages.
Some of these problems are discussed more fully below,
as is the importance of maintaining adequate reserves
of foreign exchange, an aspect of long-term
employment policy that was discounted by both
parties during our period.
b) Guaranteed Prices for Primary Products
The Labour Party undertook in 1935 to introduce a
system of guaranteed prices for all butter, cheese, wool
and meat produced during the first year after it became
the Government. In fact, it found it possible to introduce
such a system only in respect of butter and cheese. It
took over the marketing of these and some minor
products as a State monopoly in 1956. The general
concept underlying the guaranteed price scheme for
dairy products, as set out in the legislation, was that any
‘efficient producer’ ‘under usual conditions and in
normal circumstances should be assured of a sufficient
net return to enable him to maintain himself and his
family in a  reasonable state of comfort.’  In fixing prices,
regard was also to be had inter alia ‘to the costs
involved in the efficient production of dairy produce’
and to relative standards of living in the dairy industry
and in the community as a whole. It is not surprising
that, with these vague criteria and with the serious
technical difficulties involved in determining a ‘cost of
production’ upon which the guaranteed prices should
be based, differences soon arose between the Minister
of Marketing and the dairy producers on the prices paid.
In the event, the Minister adopted a set of cost standards
laid down by a Committee set up in 1938, with slight
variations. Estimated movements in these costs became
the main basis for fixing the guaranteed price until 1956.
The estimates probably involved much “horse-trading”
between the producers and the price-fixing authority.
Little attention appears to have been paid to the other
criteria in the Act, either by the Government up till 1947,
or by the Dairy Products Marketing Commission,
composed of three representatives of Government and
three of producers, with an independent Chairman,
which was made responsible for marketing and price
fixing in that year.
The almost continuous rise in export prices for dairy
products during the war and for many years afterwards
confronted the Government and the Commission with
problems in administering the scheme completely
different from those envisaged when it was introduced.
Although the Government hoped that the scheme would
be self-balancing, it was generally expected, in the weak
market situation for dairy products ruling in the late
1930’s, that the Government would be faced with
continuing deficits between market realizations and
guaranteed prices. These would have necessitated
either the abandonment of the concept of equity for
the dairy farmer or the payment of continuous subsidies
to him. In fact, the only serious deficit incurred until
1955 was one of £2 ½ million in 1938/9. Thereafter, for
many years, prices rose continuously under bulk
purchase contracts with the United Kingdom, while
farm costs were held reasonably stable by means of a
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comprehensive stabilization scheme, in which the
guaranteed price scheme became incorporated from the
end of 1942. This is discussed in section (f) below.
By 1951, £23 million had been accumulated in a
Dairy Industry Reserve Account. The main problem
arising from this was that an increasing number of
farmers, beginning to despair of sharing personally in
the funds accumulated, urged that they should not be
built up further. In 1952, the National Government
acceded to a request by the Dairy Board that, until the
1954-55 season, the full realisations received for butter
and cheese should be used for the benefit of suppliers
and dairy factories. It was only in 1956 that any
substantial drawing on the reserves had to be made. But
the fact the butter prices slumped by over 30 percent
between the beginning of 1956 and the beginning of
1957 brought some realisation that a reserve of about
£25 million was not over abundant for an industry with
annual export receipts from butter and cheese running
at about £60-70 million.
The Labour Government was unable to ‘sell’ the
guaranteed price scheme to the more individualistic
meat and wool producers in 1936. In 1942, the farmers
agreed to the establishment of a stabilization scheme for
both meat and dairy produce under which all the
proceeds of increases in prices above those ruling in
December 1942 would be paid into stabilization
accounts, unless increases in costs of production
occurred. In 1944, the Labour Government agreed
with the Meat Producers’ Board that the reserves
accumulated under the stabilization scheme belonged
to, and should be held for, the benefit of the industry.
In 1950, the National Government expressed its
understanding that the funds would be available to
cushion any sudden price fall and spread any long-term
downward trend in world prices.
Thus, in practice, if not in theory, the meat producers
were also for a time subject to the principles of a
guaranteed price scheme. However, with reserves
reaching £40 million in 1952, pressure built up for the
full pay-out of export realizations. This was conceded to
them in that year.
The Government felt unable to bring wool into their
wartime and post-war stabilization schemes due to
opposition by the producers. During the latter part of the
war, woolgrowers’ incomes were held relatively stable.
The average price of wool remained constant from
1943-46 under the bulk purchase agreement with the
United Kingdom. However, this agreement was
terminated in 1946.
With wool prices rising more rapidly thereafter than
prices for other export produce, woolgrowers, receiving
the full realizations for their produce, began to increase
their incomes more rapidly than other producers. This
naturally led to some unrest among the meat and dairy
producers subject to stabilization controls, and was a
major factor in bringing about the ultimate breakdown
of the meat and dairy produce schemes.
Although woolgrowers were not subject to
stabilization control, a fairly substantial reserve was
accumulated to protect them to some extent from future
downward fluctuations in prices. About £19 million
accrued to New Zealand from profits earned by the
Joint Organization from the sale of surplus stocks of
wool built up during the war. This, together with the
proceeds of a levy imposed by the Wool Board on
producers between 1947 and 1951 was placed in a
fund, totalling £29m by 1956, under the control of the
Wool Commission.
The Commission was authorized to fix floor prices
for wool each year and to buy in wool or subsidize
producers if wool failed to reach the floor price. Up till
the time of writing, floor prices had been maintained
well below the high ruling auction prices for wool. No
action by the Commission had been necessary except for
a very brief period in the 1951-52 season.
Important changes were made in the mid-fifties in
respect of the policy to be adopted for the use of the
meat and dairy reserves. In 1955, a system of
minimum prices for meat exported from New Zealand
was instituted. The floor prices fixed for various
classes of meat were generally at levels about 25%
below those ruling in 1954-55. In the case of dairy
produce, agreement was reached between industry
representatives and the Government that new cost
standards would be determined, and that producers
would be paid a price equal to not less than 95% of
the new basic cost standard in the first year of the
new scheme. Thereafter, floor prices were to be fixed at
a level not less than 95% of the floor price for the
previous season, after correcting that price for
changes in a cost movement index.
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The concepts of equitable distribution and relative
stability of income that were the original governing
principles in the Labour Government’s policy on farm
prices had been largely abandoned by 1957. It was
politically difficult to withhold funds from producers
in a period of rising prices, especially after fairly
sizeable reserves had been accumulated. There were
dangers of distorted development when only certain
sectors of primary production were subject to
stabilization. There was a real need to offer
encouragement to farmers to invest large sums on
development of their farms if exports were to rise in
step with rising population.
What emerged were three rather uncoordinated
floor price schemes. In the case of meat and wool,
the controlling authorities were left with a wide
discretion in fixing prices. Even in the case of dairy
produce, the authority controlling prices under the
new scheme was not so closely tied to cost movements
as in the past. The floors seemed likely to be set at
widely different levels e.g. from about 95% of ruling
prices in the case of dairy produce to about 40% of
ruling prices in the case of wool. No ceiling was set
to the extent to which incomes might rise if export
returns increased, except in the case of dairy produce
where provision was made for the payment to the
reserve account of a proportion of any surplus
realization received.
There is no question that the existence of
accumulated reserves and, in the case of dairy
produce, a virtual Government guarantee, provided
the individual producer with much greater security
than he had enjoyed in the past. However, in the
event of sharp falls in overseas prices, meat and
wool producers, in particular, could still suffer
considerable annual reductions of income. These
could well bankrupt marginal producers, especially
those who had bought farms at inflated prices.
A more serious potential problem was the effect of
the fall of export income on the ability of the country
to sustain a flow of imports adequate to maintain
employment and standards of living. Real security
for the community rested on the maintenance of
buoyant export receipts and on the building up of
adequate reserves of exchange to weather any
temporary downward trends.
c) A Floor to Wages
The Labour Government was quick to take action to
attempt to restore wages to pre-depression levels and
to guarantee each adult male a wage deemed adequate
to provide a reasonable standard of living for himself
and his family. The Finance Act of 1936 required the
restoration as from1 July 1936 of all cuts in wages
and salaries imposed during the depression period,
whether or not the workers concerned were subject to
an award of the Court of Arbitration. The Court of
Arbitration was also required in 1936 to stipulate in
its awards and agreements a basic wage sufficient to
maintain a man, his wife and three children in a fair
and reasonable standard of comfort. A Minimum Wage
Act of 1945 made legislative provision for a minimum
wage for all workers of 21 years and over, whether or
not covered by a Court award.
The major problem of wages policy throughout the
period under review was, in fact, the adjustment of
wages to continuously rising prices. The main method
adopted was to give the Court of Arbitration power in
1940 to make general orders at frequent intervals
changing the minimum rates of wages under its awards
and agreements. The Court was required to take a
variety of conditions into account in making its decisions
– notably changes in retail prices, general economic
conditions, and relative movements in the incomes of
different sections of the community. From 1944 until
1953, it was also to have regard to general economic
stability. In 1953, this provision was deleted at the
request of the workers, who were then able to argue
with justice that most other sections of the community
had their incomes determined without any reference
to the country’s stability. A provision was added
requiring the Court to consider changes in the volume
and value of primary and secondary production.
The power of the Court to make general orders was
severely criticized, especially by employers. The main
ground of objection was that the system aggravated
inflation. A return to individual bargaining, it was
claimed, would ease the pressure for increases and at
least slow up the response of wages to rising prices.
It is certainly true that the effects of the general
orders were not confined to the 40% of salary and wage
earners under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Arbitration. The other major industrial tribunals –
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those concerned with the Government services, the
railways and the waterfront – tended automatically to
apply awards of the Court to the workers under their
jurisdiction.
Also, in the circumstances of the period, employers
paying more than minimum award rates tended
nonetheless to pass on the full increases awarded by
the Court to preserve the margins they appeared to
have deemed necessary to retain staff.
But the responsibility of the general order system
for the spiral of prices and wages that occurred was
popularly exaggerated. The fact that the gap between
wages actually paid and minimum wage rates prescribed
by the Court tended to widen during the period shows
that other factors had been the prime contributory
causes of wage inflation.
There is little doubt also that the system prevented
a good deal of industrial unrest that would have
inevitably arisen in a period of sharply rising prices
if awards had had to expire before increases
were granted.
d) Monetary Benefits
One of the most significant features of our period was
the expansion of monetary benefits and pensions
granted by the state to various sections of the
community. The money cost of these rose from £7.7
million in 1938-39 to £64.4 million in 1955-56.
As a percentage of gross national income they
increased from 3.3%. in 1938-39 to 8.2% in 1946-
47 and fluctuated with a downward trend to 6.6%
in 1955-56.
The Labour Government’s Social Security Act of
1938 which, the I.L.O. claimed, ‘deeply influenced the
course of legislation in other countries’, increased the
rates of family allowances and of existing benefits for
the aged, the blind, widows, invalids, miners and
unemployed. It reduced the qualifying age for age
benefits from 65 to 60; provided new benefits for
orphans and those whose incomes had ceased on account
of sickness; and made provision for emergency
benefits for persons suffering hardship although
not entitled to any other benefits. Most of these
benefits were already subject to means tests. The
Government retained these, though in some cases on
a more liberal basis.
A significant departure from earlier legislation
was the introduction of a system of universal
superannuation, payable without means test to all
residents 65 years of age or over. The initial rate of
benefit was very low, but provision was made for
annual increases that would bring it into line with the
maximum age benefit in about 30 years time. An even
more significant increase in expenditure on monetary
benefits came from the removal in 1946 of the means
test for family benefits and the grant to mothers of ten
shillings per week for each child up to 16 years of age
(or up to 18 if still being educated).
Did these measures realise their objectives?  For the
individual, the fear of want arising from sickness,
unemployment or death had been superseded by an
assurance that, even if these misfortunes occurred, he
or his dependents would not be left destitute.
Through the benefits available to them, a married man
or a widow with two children could rely on an income
equal to about 60 percent of the wage of an adult male
labourer with the same family. This could be
supplemented to some extent if the beneficiary was
able and willing to work. From 1951, special assistance
could also be applied for in necessitous cases. To this
extent, Social Security was an accomplished fact.
Nevertheless, surveys in the mid-fifties discovered
signs of hardship on the part of single age beneficiaries
who were obliged to rent lodgings, especially if they
did not possess facilities for the preparation of their
own meals. Moreover, in cases where the breadwinner
of large families suffered extended periods of sickness,
and especially where rentals were high, a considerable
degree of privation was often evident. In this connection,
we should note the continuous erosion in the real
value of family benefits as a result of rising prices and
the unwillingness of governments to raise the rate of
benefit from ten shillings per week as fixed in 1944.
This unwillingness was probably explained by the fact
that the benefit was universal, so that about 700,000
children had become eligible for it. Any significant
increase in rates of benefit would therefore add
considerably to government expenditure.
e) Free Education and Health Services and
State Housing.
When it took office, the Labour Party placed
ips policy paper nineteen •  9
considerable emphasis on the provision for all children
of full educational opportunity from kindergarten to the
university and on the institution of a national health
service that would supply free medical, hospital and
pharmaceutical services to all who required them.
In the educational field, major developments in
policy were the restoration of the age at which children
could commence school from six years to five years in
1936; the abolition in the same year of the previous
proficiency examination and the provision of free post-
primary education for all up to the age of 19; the raising
of the school-leaving age from 14 to 15 in 1944; and
liberalisation by both governments of expenditure on
facilities, staff and assistance to students. These changes
in policy, together with a substantial increase in the
numbers of children and youths, led to a rise in current
expenditure on education from 4.2 million pounds in
1938-39 to 21.2 million pounds in 1955-56, (or from
1.8% to 2.1% of the gross national product). Capital
expenditure on school buildings had also risen
substantially e.g. the government spent 6.1 million
pounds on display in 1955-56 compared with one million
pounds in 1946-47.
There was wide support for the government’s policy
on education, despite the heavy expenditures involved.
The major criticisms made (apart from the teaching
methods currently used which were fortunately outside
the scope of this essay), were that even more weight
should be given to education, especially to techno-
logical and higher education and to expenditures on
research. There was an increasing appreciation of the
importance of improving the quality of the country’s
labour force if we were successfully to cope with the
problems posed by rapidly rising population. The
government’s educational expenditures were a valuable
investment towards achieving this end.
The increase in state expenditure on health services
was much more striking. The various health benefits
provided under the Social Security Act – benefits that
did not exist in 1938 – cost 15 1/2 million pounds in
1955-56. In addition, the cost of the various activities of
the Department of Health and the Mental Hygiene
Division rose from 800,000 pounds in 1938-39 to 5.4
million pounds in 1955-56. And finally, as a result of
the government’s gradually taking over from local
ratepayers financial responsibility for the operation
of public hospitals, transfers to hospital boards from
the Central Government had risen from 900,000 pounds
in 1938-39 to 10.7 million pounds in 1955-56.
The experience of New Zealand in the provision of
free health services had been somewhat akin to that of
the United Kingdom. The increasing demand in
response to lower prices had been greater than
expected. One could not look with equanimity at the
apparent waste of resources involved, especially in
the provision of pharmaceutical benefits. Government
payments for prescriptions under the scheme,
which were 536,000 pounds in the first full year of its
operation (1942-43), rose to 1.4 million pounds in 1946-
47 and 4 million pounds in 1955-56. The number of
prescriptions given per head of population, and the
average cost of each prescription, had been rising
steadily, as had payments to doctors under the medical
benefits scheme. The average cost per head of medical
benefits had risen from nearly one pound in 1946-47 to
33 shillings in 1955-56.
The statistics of morbidity showed gains in
community health after 1938. These were probably
attributable in some degree to the more widespread
availability of health services. But the evidence of
increasing recourse to doctors and medicines could not
be regarded as healthy. Steps were taken by the
National Government to attempt to combat excessive
and unnecessary prescriptions by doctors. Temporary
success in reducing costs in 1953-54 was not sustained.
The government had not seen fit to impose any charge
on prescriptions nor to restrict the type of
prescriptions to be covered by the scheme.
The Labour Government instituted its State rental
housing scheme in March, 1937. By the year ended
March 1939, over 40% of permits issued for new houses
or flats were for government units. Construction was
considerably reduced during the war, but the program
was resumed and intensified from 1944 onwards. Permits
for about 5400 government units were issued in the
last year of the Labour government’s period of office.
However, state rental housing never comprised the
major proportion of new dwellings built, even during
the Labour Government’s regime. The construction of
private dwellings, fostered by cheap and easy credit
made available through the State Advances Corporation,
and under the Rehabilitation Scheme, rose more rapidly
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than the construction of State houses. By 1950,
permits issued for the latter were only 30% of total
permits issued. Their relative importance declined
further after the National Government took office with
a policy of encouraging private home ownership. The
number of permits issued for Government units
averaged only about 3400 per annum from 1950. In
1955 they comprised only 16% of all permits issued.
As part of its housing policy, the National
government encouraged State tenants to purchase
their houses on terms that were extremely generous
compared with the cost of current building. Even so,
many tenants were so well off on “subsidised” rentals
that they were reluctant to take up the generous offers
made. Both governments failed to raise rentals as
maintenance and/or interest costs rose. In 1955, the
General Manager of the State Advances Corporation
reported that the accumulated loss in respect of State
rental houses was about 1,166,000 pounds.
The National Government recognised early in its
period of office that the subsidisation of all State house
tenants could hardly be justified on any welfare ground.
But its election promises to existing tenants made it
impossible for it to do more than raise rentals to more
economic levels when existing tenancies were vacated.
This created anomalies and reduced mobility. For
instance, married couples whose children had left home
could hardly be expected to move to a smaller house
when they had to pay a higher rental for the latter. In the
face of this situation, the government made provision
for a complete readjustment of rentals at the beginning
of 1958, after the next election had been held. (It lost
that election.)
Prosperity, the boost in natural increase and
immigration, and the backlog due to the drop in
construction during the war, led to an acute shortage of
housing. This persisted, with diminishing severity, up
till the end of the period under review. If anything, the
National government took upon itself more
responsibility for satisfying the housing needs of the
country than did its predecessors. After conferences
with those engaged in the building industry, it
introduced a wide range of measures designed to
rationalise and speed up the construction of houses,
encourage the use of low-cost designs and make
finance readily available to those building or buying
homes. As a result, the annual output of houses greatly
increased, as did the number of rooms available per
person. Because insufficient attention had been given
to matching the increased supplies of money made
available for housing with the resources available to the
building industry, average dwelling costs rose more
rapidly than most other price indices.
f ) Price Stability
A major problem of government during the period was
to prevent its welfare measures from being undermined
by steadily rising prices. Insecurity took a new form.
The fear of a cut in real income through unemployment
or reduction of remuneration was replaced by the fear
of being unable to keep one’s income in step with an
increasing cost of living. In fact, most people managed
to keep their incomes well ahead of prices, but those
depending heavily on relatively fixed incomes from
savings, superannuation, rents etc suffered severely.
A great deal of the problem of rising prices was
externally generated. Export prices had risen by about
190 percent between 1937 and 1956, while import
prices had risen by about 180 percent. It has been
suggested that, given a suitable exchange rate policy,
the New Zealand price level could have been largely
insulated from these overseas trends. The political and
economic difficulties of such a policy led both
governments to favour fixed exchange rates as a general
rule. The Labour government came to office in 1935
intending gradually to restore the exchange rate to
parity with sterling. It found it impracticable to do so
until 1948.
In that year, a favourable set of circumstances made
appreciation a highly desirable policy both
economically and politically. The reserves of foreign
exchange were reasonably satisfactory; there was a
growing disparity between farm incomes and wages;
import prices were increasing and wool prices were
rising fairly rapidly; and payments to meat and dairy
producers were divorced from external receipts
under the stabilisation scheme. It would be difficult
to point to any other period where such a favourable
situation for exchange rate appreciation existed.
(Whether it should have been pegged at that
level for so long afterwards is, with hindsight,
extremely doubtful.)
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Given a policy of relatively fixed exchange rates, the
rise in retail prices in New Zealand does not seem unduly
excessive when viewed against the background of the
external circumstances confronting the economy. In
comparison with the UK and North America, the rise in
retail prices was particularly small during the war and
even up till 1949. A major reason for this relative
stability was the extensive stabilisation programme
agreed to by the major interest groups at the end of 1942.
The program involved the institution of the
stabilisation accounts for meat and dairy produce and
other minor farm products outlined above; agreement by
wage earners to the maintenance of rates of remuneration
at 1942 levels, except in so far as it was necessary to
adjust anomalies or if a wartime prices index covering a
limited number of “essentials” rose by more than two
and a half percent; agreement by the government to
stabilise the price level of 110 basic commodities and
services, by subsidy if necessary; and the fixation of
transport rates and rents not already controlled.
In addition to these arrangements, the major interest
rates were pegged at very low levels. Price control,
introduced even before the war, was further extended in
1943 to cover the retail prices of many kinds of fruit and
vegetables. Towards the end of 1943, in the light of a
substantial increase of land-transfer transactions,
controls were placed on sales and leases of land, with
the general objective of stabilising values at 1942
levels. An extensive system of rationing of food and
clothing and of allocation of materials and fuel was also
gradually evolved during the war.
This comprehensive system of direct control over
prices and incomes was supplemented by high taxation
and by the control of credit. In his first wartime budget,
the Minister Finance, Walter Nash, announced that his
policy would be to “tax to the economic limit for war
purposes and borrow for essential productive works
and for any balance of war requirements”. As he put
it more forcefully in a later budget speech, in
circumstances such as those existing in wartime,
“creation of credit takes away by unseen methods the
value of work done and savings made and ultimately in
the form of price increases hits those most who have to
spend their incomes on necessities of life.”
Mr Nash’s “orthodox” attitude had previously
provoked acute opposition from some members of his
party with a Social Credit background. These members
envisaged more and more of the government’s
expenditure being financed by the creation of
“debt-free money”. After a period of dissension, which
culminated in the expulsion of an undersecretary from
the government and party, Mr Nash’s view prevailed.
Despite steep tax increases, the Government did not
find it possible to avoid borrowing from the banking
system to the extent of nearly 50 million pounds in the
first three years of the war. After the introduction of its
stabilisation policy in late 1942, however, it prohibited
the trading banks from purchasing Government
securities. It had repaid about 12 million pounds of its
debt to the banking system by 1946. In the First World
War, the Government raised all New Zealand’s war
expenses by loan, and one third of them from overseas.
65% of the 650 million pounds spent on financing the
Second World War was obtained from current revenue.
No new overseas debt was incurred – in fact 45 million
pounds was repaid.
To control the level of the other major form of
trading bank credit, a selective advances control policy
was introduced in January 1942. This policy was based
not on statutory control, but on cooperation by the banks
in limiting their advances for speculation and for other
purposes deemed inconsistent with the prosecution of
the war effort, such as property purchases, the finance
of hire purchase schemes and so on.
The wartime stabilisation policy has been described
in some detail because, in its essentials, it remained the
basis of the policy of the Labour Party until its defeat
in 1949. It was never contemplated that the economy
could or should be completely stabilised. There were
changes in the details of the policy even before the end
of the war. The main problems arose because of the
impossibility of holding down all prices and wages in an
inflationary situation, complicated by steeply rising
import and export prices.
With considerable competition for labour, actual
wage rates in many industries rose above the award
levels. Long hours of overtime further swelled the
aggregate wages bill. Since the increased earnings were
unevenly spread, anomalies appeared in the wage
structure. Award wages could not remain unaffected by
these developments. The wages situation was
complicated by the fact that the government had
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established a multiplicity of specialised wage fixing
authorities in particular industries not covered by the
Court of Arbitration. These included coal mining,
waterfront work and the railways, while the government
itself was responsible for fixing the salaries of public
servants and the wages of agricultural workers. Since
most of the independent authorities were merely
required to have regard to the general purposes of the
Stabilisation Regulations, differences of interpretation
were inevitable.
In 1944, increases granted to miners and seamen by
their authorities, and to certain agricultural workers by
the government, provoked unrest. The government
eventually acceded to pressure by amending the
Regulations in February 1945 to allow the Court to
adjust “disparities”. Accordingly, the Court increased
the standard rate of wages for the various categories of
worker by 3 ½ pence per hour, while the government
granted a retrospective increase to all State employees.
The Court felt justified in making further increases of a
similar amount in 1947 and 1949. As a result of these
changes, the nominal weekly wage rates of all adult
workers in 1949 were about 23% above the level
prevailing in 1945.
These developments, and the continued rise in import
prices after the war, made it inevitable that domestic
prices should rise more than they had during the war,
unless the government was willing to ask taxpayers to
bear a heavy burden of subsidies. Faced with the
prospect of a subsidy bill of 20 million pounds in 1947,
the government deemed it wise to withdraw subsidies
worth 12 million pounds a year. Despite this, by the time
the Labour Government left office, the annual cost of the
remaining subsidies had again been forced up by rising
internal and import costs to nearly 15 million pounds.
As indicated previously, the stabilisation of prices
paid to meat and dairy producers was continued after the
war. Price control was maintained with little alteration in
principle in the early post-war years and given the
semblance of permanence in the Control of Prices Act
1947. It was necessary for frequent price adjustments to
be made to cover increased costs arising from
increasing wages and import prices and from the
removal of subsidies. Rationing was gradually relaxed,
but cream, butter, motor spirits and eggs were not freed
until after 1950. Allocations of many building materials
were retained even after that date.
The Labour Government after the war placed much
more reliance on this system of direct controls than on
budgetary and monetary weapons. Taxation was
certainly maintained at a very high level, but so was
public expenditure. The government were forced to add
to state indebtedness to the banking system between
1947 and 1949, thus aggravating the inflationary
problems with which they were already faced. The
continuation of the advance control policy and of the
policy of prohibiting the trading banks from taking up
Government securities, combined with restrictions on
overseas spending by import and exchange control,
prevented the accretion to the cash base of the banks
from being reflected in a multiple expansion of bank
credit. In fact, bank advances and investments combined
were practically stationary over the same period.
No attempt was made to use interest rates as an anti-
inflationary device. Money was deliberately kept as
cheap as possible. Bank interest rates and the rates
controlled by order-in-council were pegged at their low
wartime levels. A combination of factors, such as State
lending on mortgage at low rates, a plentiful supply
of money, a relatively stable price level and many
limitations on expenditure, ensured that free rates of
interest would also remain relatively low. The average
rate on mortgages remained consistently below 4%
from 1947 to 1949 and the yield on Government
securities at about 3%.
To prevent the people’s high money incomes
from being diverted excessively to expenditure or
investment overseas, the government preferred to rely
on its system of administrative control of imports and
exchange, rather than on indirect control through
tariffs or exchange rates.
The Labour Government’s emphasis on the use of
direct controls as an instrument of policy was inspired
partly by persistent fear of a recurrence of
unemployment in New Zealand. It also had a profound
distrust of the market mechanism as a means of
allocating the resources of the community among the
various uses to which they could be put. “Rationing
by the purse” had to be avoided as far as possible,
especially in the case of commodities deemed essential.
Some Socialists would argue that the need to use
direct controls to ensure fair shares could be avoided by
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making shares more equal through redistributive
taxation and expenditure. The Labour Government
obviously felt that any marked increase of
redistributive taxation would have a serious effect on
incentives to produce. This provided ammunition for
its left-wing critics, who claimed that could prove that
the further extension of public ownership was needed
to achieve another major objective of socialism. The
majority view of the party seems to have been that to
attempt such an extension at all rapidly would be
tantamount to committing political suicide.
In the years immediately after the war, the retention
of direct controls was inevitable if open inflation was
to be avoided. Exclusive reliance on more drastic
taxation, for example, would have been countered by
the public’s drawing on their accumulated wartime
savings. But the Labour Government was not
excessively concerned about reducing the volume of
purchasing power and potential purchasing power. It
preferred to err on the side of inflation, to keep the
economy at full steam, even if that did involve the
need for retention of direct controls.
As was to be expected, both political and economic
difficulties arose from the methods of control favoured
by the Labour Government. Price controls, especially
if they are administered on a cost-plus basis, as the New
Zealand system generally was, tend to penalise
efficiency. Since it is administratively impossible to
control all goods and services, they tend to divert
resources away from the more essential items, which
are controlled, to the less essential, which are left more
or less free to take advantage of the inflationary
pressures. In New Zealand, further anomalies arose
because of the lack of coordination among the civil
authorities fixing prices, rents and transport charges
using varying criteria for their decisions. There was
evidence of evasion of some of the controls, especially
in the case of land and property sales, where “under the
counter” transfers were common.
The protective import controls removed or reduced
the stimulus that potential overseas competition gives
to efficiency in local industries. While subsidies may
have restrained increases in the minimum rates of
wages prescribed in awards and agreements, wages
actually paid rose more rapidly. Indeed, the addition
to Government expenditure involved probably
worsened the inflationary tendencies in the economy.
There are better and less costly means of making
essentials adequately available to poorer sections of
the community than by making them artificially cheap
for everyone. Many of these obvious disadvantages
of direct controls and subsidies, especially the lack of
incentives to efficiency and the tendency towards a
diversion of resources to relatively non-essential
occupations, were present in the New Zealand economy
in the early post-war period.
In general, the controls were applied relatively
flexibly. In the prevailing economic and political
circumstances, the stabilisation policy, supplemented
by an appreciation of the currency in 1948, was on
balance beneficial to New Zealand. By restraining
potential increases in disposable farm income and the
agitation for wage increases, the controls held back
considerably the potential pressure of demand.
Moreover, by holding down costs, they prevented
secondary spirals of prices and wages of an
unpredictable amount.
The situation would almost certainly have been
improved by stricter budgetary policy. However
inflationary forces were to a large extent inevitable in
the prevailing international conditions and with the
large domestic accumulations of purchasing power.
New Zealand farmers were able to maintain a low cost
structure in comparison with their competitors, to
increase their real incomes gradually, to avoid such a
rapid escalation of prices of land and other farm
costs as happened in every previous boom, and to
accumulate reserves which promised them a degree
of income security unknown in the past.
It is unlikely that the majority of wage and salary
earners would have gained significantly by a more
open inflation. The relative price and income stability
of the period was not accompanied by the stagnation
of industry. Income per head increased progressively
throughout the period.
The National Party was elected to office late in
1949. Its declared objective was to “make the pound
go further”, by removing the root causes of inflation.
It listed these in the election policy statement as
the creation of money and credit, wasteful
Government expenditure which necessitated high
taxation, with its adverse effect on incentives,
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and State interference with industry and commerce, in
particular by price control, import control and the
Land Sales Act.
There was a substantial relaxation of controls in
the new government’s first year of office. Many items
were liberated from price control. Controls over land
and property sales were abolished. Rising export receipts
made possible such a significant removal of import
controls that the government could say in the first
Economic Survey issued in the middle of 1951 that
“import licensing does not restrict imports except where
they compete with New Zealand industries or require to
be paid for in hard currencies.”
To allow scope for tax concessions, subsidies on
coal and tea were withdrawn and those on bread, flour,
milk, butter and eggs were substantially reduced. The
trading banks were also permitted to share to some
extent in this general advance to freedom by being given
somewhat more discretion in the granting of advances.
The Government had been led to believe by the
overseas recession of 1948-49 that it would be assisted
in the task of reducing the cost of living by a fall in
import prices. With the deterioration of the international
situation and the outbreak of the Korean war, external
influences soon became profoundly inflationary. One
effect on the New Zealand economy was a phenomenal
increase in receipts from wool. Later, costs were
affected as import prices began to reflect the world
scarcity of key commodities. Inflationary elements also
still persisted in the domestic situation. In particular,
an even more rapid population increase added to the
need for investment expenditure, while New Zealand
was still trying to cope with the backlog of replacements
accumulated during and after the war and to make
additions to the capital stock demanded by people
with high incomes and savings.
With this background, it was obvious that the
government would have the utmost difficulty in
fulfilling its election pledges. If freedom was to be
restored to the economy and price increases held
within reasonable limits, a severe budgetary and
monetary policy was necessary to restrict demand.
The main action taken by the government to deal with
the situation was its wool retention scheme. It secured
the agreement of the wool industry to set aside, in
frozen bank accounts to the credit of individual
growers, one third of proceeds from the sale of greasy
wool in the 1950-51 season. Total receipts for 1950-51
were about 143 million pounds. This was 81 million
pounds more than in the previous season. Accordingly
the retention scheme went only part of the way to
meeting the problem.
The government made some strenuous efforts to
restrict its own expenditure. It achieved reductions in
subsidies, law and order and the maintenance of public
works. Total expenditures increased by only 6 million
pounds in 1950-51. But it proved impossible to hold
back the pressure for increases. Government expenditure
rose by more than 30 million pounds in 1951-52. Despite
the tax reductions granted in 1950 and 1951, budgeted
revenue surpluses of 26.6 million pounds and 40.2
million pounds were achieved in 1950-51 and 1951-52,
due to the buoyancy of incomes and increases in receipts
from sales tax and customs duties with greater imports.
However these surpluses were inadequate in the
prevailing circumstances.
The major weakness of policy lay in the monetary
field. The advantages derived from the Government’s
reversal of its predecessor’s policy of drawing on
Reserve Bank credit were more than offset by a
tremendous expansion of trading bank credit. The
Reserve Bank asked the banks in October 1950 and
May 1951 to adopt a cautious lending policy. But
advances rose by more than 80 million pounds between
June 1950 and June 1952. The demand for credit grew
for a variety of reasons. The high prices for wool in
1950-51 sent wool buyers, woollen mills and freezing
companies to the banks for more accommodation. The
waterfront strike of 1950-51 embarrassed the export
industries and many others. Higher costs increased the
need for working capital throughout industry. The most
important factor was the desire of the distributive trades
to build up their stocks to take advantage of the buoyant
demand in the economy. Many barriers to the importation
of goods from overseas, now much more freely available
than before, had also been removed.
Consequently New Zealand’s inflationary demand
was again able to turn partly to overseas markets for
satisfaction. When wool prices dropped from the
astronomical heights in mid-1951, a serious drain on
foreign exchange reserves commenced. The situation
was allowed to drift for some time. The Reserve Bank
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issued a stronger directive to the banks in November
1951, but this was ineffective in bringing about any
reduction of advances before May 1952 and the re-
imposition of import control on motor cars. By April
1952, the Reserve Bank was alarmed that the country’s
net overseas assets had fallen by 50 million pounds
since June 1951 and had continued to decline throughout
the export season. It introduced a system of exchange
allocation. Largely because they had applied insufficient
restraint on bank credit, the authorities had felt obliged
to restore a form of direct control on imports.
In 1952-53, the volume of trading bank credit and
imports fell away, as traders rid themselves of excessive
stocks built up in the previous year. With import prices
falling, (a trend which was to continue for the next three
years), it seemed possible that New Zealand might
achieve price stability for the first time since the
Depression. However, the favourable effects on
spending of the fall in bank credit were offset by a
substantial balance of payments surplus and by
increased borrowing by government from the banking
system. The latter arose from an attempt to relieve
pressure on the loan market by not seeking funds from
the public. Another large balance of payments surplus
was achieved in 1953-54. The volume of money in
circulation rose by about 40 million pounds between
January 1953 and January 1954.
In the light of the improved balance of payments
position, the Government and the Reserve Bank gradually
relaxed and eventually removed the system of exchange
allocation. Again, monetary and fiscal policies proved
inadequate to control domestic spending. Although
Government expenditure was reasonably well controlled,
private expenditure was fostered by a substantial
expansion of bank advances and by tax concessions. It
rose by 155 million pounds, or over 25%, in 1954-55.
It is not surprising that the balance of payments on
current account again moved into deficit by 39 million
pounds in the same period. Despite this, prices
continued to rise, certainly at a slower rate than the 6%
average for the previous five years but not
insignificantly at 2%. In the following year, prices again
rose by 2½% and the balance of payments on current
account showed a further deficit of 34 million pounds.
In the year ending January 1957, the balance of
payments appeared to be moving into a slight surplus,
as a result of a substantial rise in export receipts and a
small fall in imports. The volume of money had remained
relatively stable. A fall in trading bank advances of
about 20 million pounds had been largely offset by
higher Reserve Bank credit. Prices had continued to
increase rather more rapidly than in the two previous
years. Major reasons for this, apart from continued
high domestic spending, had been an unusually
marked shortage of potatoes and a rise in import prices
of two or three percent.
The index of consumer-prices had risen by nearly
50% since 1949. Domestic expenditure had risen
continuously, but in a series of fits and starts associated
with marked swings in the volume of bank credit and in
the balance of payments. In the early part of this period,
the problems were largely externally generated. Since
1954 they had been mainly due to inadequate control of
domestic expenditure by monetary and fiscal policy.
The Reserve Bank had begun to try to control the
volume of trading bank credit much more closely
than before. In its 1956 budget, the Government had
increased taxation slightly after a long series of
budgets granting tax concessions. Although this
increase was insufficient in the circumstances, it
indicated a greater awareness than before of the
importance of controlling expenditure if prices were to
be held reasonably stable and reserves of foreign
exchange built up to a more adequate level.
Leisure and Working Conditions
One of the first measures of the Labour Government
was to introduce legislation providing for a 40-hour
week in most industries, and for a reduction of working
hours in shops and offices from 48 to 44. In both cases
this was to be effected without reduction in the weekly
wage rate. At first, provision was made for special
exemptions from these provisions in certain cases.
Legislation in 1945 and 1946 made the 40-hour week
almost universal, both in industry and in shops and
offices. In 1948 and 1949, a seven-hour day was
stipulated for underground workers in mines.
Thus, the New Zealand worker became entitled to
work a considerably shorter working week than was the
case before our period. In fact, a large proportion of the
labour force worked considerably more than 40 hours a
week. The 1956 Year Book shows that the average male
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wage earner in factories worked 163 hours overtime in
1953-54. In many industries, the fact that overtime work
was available was regarded as a valuable means of
attracting and retaining staff. Again, in the 1951 census,
14 percent of males and 4 percent of females actively
engaged claimed that they worked 60 hours or more
per week. 34 percent of males and 12 percent of females
said that they worked 45 hours or more.
As a result of the introduction of the 40-hour week,
and accompanying legislation controlling sales by
shops permitted to remain open at the weekend, the
shopping centres of cities and towns were largely
deserted on Saturdays and Sundays. The housewife in
most places would have found it difficult to replenish
her stocks if they proved inadequate for the weekend
needs. The National Government introduced legislation
designed to improve this position somewhat, in the face
of rather vocal opposition by the interests affected.
Legislative provision was made in 1944 for an annual
holiday of two weeks for all workers, whether
permanently or casually employed. Many measures
were introduced with the object of improving working
conditions. Conditions for the average worker
improved considerably during the period, partly through
legislative provisions and partly through greater
competition for labour. However, industrial accidents
continued at a level that caused concern. Over 2,900,000
days of work were estimated to have been lost through
such accidents in 1954.
Industrial Relations
Although industrial disputes had been a much less
important cause of loss of working time than industrial
accidents, New Zealand had by no means been “the
country without strikes” during our period. The number
of disputes increased markedly during the Labour
government’s period of office in comparison with the
previous 15 years. Even in the period from 1939 to 1946,
an average of 40,000 days work per year was lost
through industrial disputes. During the last three years
of the Labour Government’s term of office the problem
became more serious. About 100,000 days work were
lost in both 1947 and 1948 and 220,000 in 1949. The
stoppages occurred despite the fact the legislation
governing the various wage tribunals, and the Strike
and Lockout Emergency Regulations of 1939, had
virtually withdrawn the legal right to strike. The law
was not enforced by the Labour Government. It
preferred where possible to settle strikes that
threatened to become serious by securing the grant of
compromise concessions to the workers concerned.
The industrial Labour movement in New Zealand
had been for a long time broadly divided into two wings.
There was a “militant” wing, composed mainly of large-
scale unions in key positions in the economy such as the
watersiders’, miners’ and freezing workers’ unions. The
more “moderate” wing was composed largely of smaller
unions, whose membership was increased considerably
by the introduction of compulsory unionism in 1936.
They were conscious of their lack of individual
bargaining power and of their dependence on the
Court of Arbitration for a legal minimum wage. The
overt unrest of the period was concentrated in the
“militant” unions. Many of their leaders regarded the
arbitration system as merely a method of holding the
unions while they were shorn by the employers, and as
a barrier to the fundamental reconstruction of society
that they desired. They were anxious to take full
advantage of their strength in the period of buoyant
demand. They were able to point to the considerable
improvement of their position on the relative income
scale as an illustration to fellow workers of the
advantages of direct action.
The two wings of the union movement remain united
in an uneasy alliance throughout the Labour regime.
At the first conference of the Federation of Labour after
the change of government, one-third of the 225
unionists of the country split of into a separate Trades
Union Congress with a more militant program than the
majority in the Federation would support.
The National Party had come to power in 1949 with
the promise to deal firmly with the militant unions. It
was not long before it was put to the test. In 1950 some
270,000 days of work were lost due mainly to three
serious waterfront disputes, a stoppage in the coal mines,
protest strikes in ten industries against the removal of
subsidies, and a general railway strike over the Christmas
holiday period, which was eventually settled by
compromise between the government and the strikers.
The showdown came in February 1951, when 8000
watersiders refused to perform overtime work at the
peak of the export season, because of dissatisfaction
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with the extent of the wage increase offered by
their employers.
The Government met this situation by coming out
strongly against the watersiders, who were later joined
by about 12,000 workers in other industries for at least
part of the 20 week dispute. This was the most serious
in New Zealand’s history, over one million man days
of work being lost. A state of emergency was declared.
When the watersiders refused to return to work,
Armed Forces were drafted to perform work on the
wharves and to maintain other essential services
affected by sympathy strikes.
To overcome the difficulties of dealing effectively
with the situation under the existing law, power was
taken under emergency regulations to suspend many of
the traditional civil liberties. Regulations permitted
arrest without warrant and the seizure of funds of
unions and union members. They prevented picketing
or meetings and publications in support of the strikers.
They also swept aside the legal difficulties of defining
a strike and establishing responsibility for acts contrary
to the regulations. The continued existence of
compulsory unionism – which the government had
promised to abolish in its election platform – enabled
it to deregister some of the striking unions and replace
them by people who were willing to work under the
conditions offered by the employers.
The Government would have been in extreme
difficulty if the other unions of the country had sided
with the strikers. The Federation of Labour in fact
supported the Government’s stand. It even opposed
the action of the Parliamentary Labour Party in
attacking the provisions of the Emergency
Regulations. That the majority opinion of the country
was with the government was clearly indicated by the
result of a snap election that was held after strike had
been broken.
The period after the strike was one of comparative
industrial peace. Having fought the government and
suffered defeat, the more militant unions appeared
to have lost influence. The Trades Union Congress
collapsed. For their part, the Government took
steps to amend industrial legislation so as to
strengthen their ability to cope with any similar problem
in the future and to weaken the possibility of Communist
domination of the unions which, the government alleged,
was a primary factor in the waterfront dispute.
Under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration
Act, the definitions of strikes and lockout were
considerably widened. Heavy penalties were provided
for members and officials of unions who participated
in strikes or lockouts without a secret ballot being
taken. Union officials had to be elected by secret ballot.
The Registrar of Unions could refuse to record any rule
or amendment that he considered “unreasonable or
oppressive.” Under the Police Offences Amendment
Act of 1951, the Government also strengthened to
some extent the law relating to sedition and intimidation.
They did not go as far as they had originally intended,
due to a strong public outcry against some of their
proposals to write part of the emergency regulations
into the Statute Book. There was great opposition to
proposals that would have placed the onus of proof on
the accused rather than on the Crown.
Such legislation embodied a rather negative
approach to the problem of industrial unrest. Despite
the apparent harmony in industry after 1951, much
remained to be done to improve relationships between
employers and employed in New Zealand. A start was
made in the work of the Industrial Advisory Council
set up in 1949.
Those who argued that both groups should
participate more fully in the formulation and
implementation of national policy did not find it easy
to make progress. Most New Zealand unions were still
preoccupied with the task of fighting for their share of
the cake and for good working conditions. They had
done little to prepare themselves to take a greater part
in management or to put forward well-considered
views on national problems.
There was some sign that management was
gradually becoming more conscious of its wider
social responsibilities. An Institute of Industrial
Management has been formed to offer training classes
in foremanship and general business management on
a fairly elementary level. Senior public servants and
business executives had begun to hold residential
conferences on management problems. But there
was an obvious need for organised training at a
higher level to enable managers and trade union
officials to study the techniques and social
implications of their respective functions.
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The Pattern of Growth
a) Introduction
Was the growth of the New Zealand economy over the
period balanced? Unfortunately, as mentioned in the
introduction, there is no convenient yardstick by
which to measure the desirability of a given pattern
of development.
There are cases where an economy is clearly out of
balance. It was said, for example, that the post-war
Australian economy was in danger of becoming “a milk
bar economy with no milk”, because of the relative
stagnation of its export industries, its agriculture and its
basic sources of power and raw materials. There was no
comparable lack of balance in the New Zealand economy
after the war. But, subject to similar influences, the
tendency towards some of Australia’s problems was
present. New Zealand by no means grossly misused the
limited resources of labour and capital at its disposal, but
it tended to pay insufficient attention to certain activities
vital to the future development of the country.
When they first came to power, many members of
the Labour Government had the introduction of a system
of detailed government planning of the use of the
country’s resources in mind. If the big American
corporations could plan the operation of their vast
empires, they asked, why should not the government
plan the operations of the New Zealand economy?  One
of their first pieces of legislation was the Industrial
Efficiency Act of 1936. This set up a Bureau of
Industry to guide the Minister of Industries and
Commerce on planning and development
This Act envisaged the Bureau making
recommendations on everything connected with the
development of new industries and the rationalisation of
old ones. In fact it became primarily a device for limiting,
by licensing, entry into certain occupations whose
existing members sought protection against “excessive
competition” which would cause “over-capitalisation”.
Industrial plans involving some degree of rationalisation
were implemented for only four industries – pharmacy,
flax, footwear and radio manufacture. Forty-five
industries were subject to licensing under the Act at one
time or another. Most of them were very small, some
with only one licensee, eg. those concerned with the
manufacture of agar-agar and macaroni. In late 1956,
only three industries remained subject to the provisions
of the Act, although two other industries previously
licensed under it were by then licensed under separate
legislation.
There were many reasons for the failure of the
Bureau. It was hampered from the start by the
inadequacy of the information available about the
structure of the economy. It was never given sufficient
qualified staff, unencumbered by other duties, to
make a detailed survey of New Zealand industry. Its
members were busy men, preoccupied with other
interests. Due to the continued prosperity of the period
and the protection afforded after 1939 by import control,
industry itself lost interest in rationalisation. Moreover
unions and consumers were never represented on the
Bureau. The government was never willing to impose
rationalisation on any industry or even to force
individual units of an industry to conform to the plan
adopted by majority of its members.
Another attempt at comprehensive planning was
made early in 1944 with the setting up of an
Organisation for National Development to study and
plan for the transition from war to peace. National
committees, composed of departmental officers and
outside interests were appointed to cover the major
aspects of development, with a central coordinating
committee at the head. This experiment was also
unsuccessful. It was dropped soon after the end of the
war, never having aroused any enthusiasm, either among
the departmental heads primarily concerned, or among
other sections of the public.
Thus, while the activities of New Zealand’s industry
were extensively controlled, there was no coordinated
plan aiming at the best use resources.
b) Balanced Industrial Development?
NZ’s labour force grew from about 672,000 in 1939 to
about 815,000 in April 1956. Of the total increase of
143,000, about 95,000 went into secondary industries
and 88,000 into tertiary, with labour force in the primary
sector declining by 28,000.
The most spectacular development was in the
manufacturing industries, and in particular in those
industries most heavily dependent on imported materials
and equipment. Consumers’ goods became only about
16 percent of total imports, compared with about 30%
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pre-war. The growth of manufacturing industry by no
means “insulated” New Zealand from the effects of
reductions in the prices of her traditional exports. They
still provided practically the whole of the country’s
earnings of foreign exchange. There was little scope for
meeting a fall in export receipts by cutting down the
importation of “non-essential” consumers’ goods. In
the absence of adequate reserves of foreign exchange
or overseas borrowing, the materials and equipment
required for manufacturing industry would soon be
affected. In short, New Zealand was still very much a
dependent, farm-based economy.
It is hard to determine how far the protective devices
discussed above fostered the development of
manufacturing industry in New Zealand during the
period. With continually increasing export receipts,
growing population, shortages of imported suppliers
and the relative stability of New Zealand’s prices during
and immediately after the war, substantial growth of
secondary industry could have been expected,
regardless of protection. But there was undoubtedly a
section of manufacturing industry whose continued
existence depended on the maintenance of the shelter
of import control.
Protection sustained a proportion of totally inefficient
production. It generally reduced the pressure to
rationalise and improve that would have come from
outside competition operating through a tariff barrier.
Labour was drawn off to protected concerns from
other manufacturing industries, from important public
works projects and to some extent, from farming.
The main reduction of the labour force in farming was
a natural development, arising from the marked
increase in machinery, fertilisers and other capital
equipment used. But there is little doubt that the
efficiency of the economy would have been improved,
without adverse effects on other aspects of welfare, by
a somewhat less protective policy in respect of
manufacturing industry.
More positive action could also have been taken to
foster the efficiency of manufacturing industry. The size
of the typical manufacturing establishment remained
very small by overseas standards. The average number
of persons engaged per factory was about 17 in 1954.
This raised difficulties, particularly in the fields of
finance and research. Many small manufacturers have
relied heavily on the trading banks for finance, not a
desirable basis at the time for any significant expansion.
The State Advances Corporation was permitted to
make advances for industrial purposes, but probably
because its criteria were primarily those of a mortgage
institution, manufacturers had not sought its services.
Some of us saw merit in the idea of setting up a special
institution to provide long-term credit to small and
medium-sized businesses, along lines of the Finance
Corporation for Industry in the United Kingdom.
Too little attention had also been given to research
into the problems of industry. Only a few firms found it
feasible to set up research departments of their own.
The government provided valuable, but limited,
assistance through the Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research. The dairy, leather, laundry, wool
and pottery industries had research association
 jointly financed by the industry and the government.
The scientific labour force was too small and attention
was directed almost entirely at applied problems of
servicing and development, leaving little scope for
basic research. Similar comments could be made about
the rather neglected field of distribution.
In farming, the effect of the decline in the labour
force on production was much more than offset by
more extensive use of capital. This was fostered by
the high net returns enjoyed during most of the
period and by tax concessions on farm investment. A
particularly noteworthy development had been
the growth of aerial top dressing of hill country
pastures. During the year ending March 1956,
3,850,000 acres were treated in this way with 405,000
tonnes of fertiliser. Discoveries in the field of trace
elements enabled previously unimproved land to be
brought into production at the rate of about
80,000 acres a year. A large part of the development
work had been undertaken by the government. Farmers
increasingly appreciated the value of the research
and extension work being done by the government
and others institutions. In 1957, there was an
unsatisfied demand for research into and instruction
in the best methods of farm management for particular
areas. I believed that more expenditure on training
and employment of people to undertake this work would
have been a very worthwhile investment.
Two fields of activity that presented problems during
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the period were transport and power. In each, New
Zealand suffered from deficiencies in maintenance and
expansion due largely to war and post-war dislocations
and scarcities. Excessive outlay by the community
on other fields was also a factor in leaving inadequate
resources available to expand power and transport
facilities to meet the demands of a growing and
more prosperous population.
Various restrictions on the use of power were found
necessary from 1941 till late in 1952, when most of them
were removed. An indication of the growth of demand
for electric power in the period can be obtained from the
fact that the State Hydro- Electric Departments in 1955
was feeding over three times as much electricity into the
retail distribution system as it was in 1939. In the face of
the probable inadequacy of sources of hydro power in
the North Island to meet estimated demands there in the
1960s, a new coal-fired steam station was being built at
Mercer and a geothermal station at Wairakei.
The possibility of linking the power system of the
North Island with that of the South, more abundantly
supplied with untapped sources of hydro power, was
being closely studied.
Inadequate maintenance of the road system was
being rapidly overcome by heavy expenditures under
the auspices of a National Roads Board. This was set up
by the government in 1953 and given exclusive use of
the proceeds of motor taxation. Major problems in
transport in the mid-50s arose from the inadequacy of
facilities provided by the railways and the ports
to handle the growing volume of production of the
country, and in particular the growing volume of
exportable produce.
c) The Balance between Present and Future
Any country may increase its present standard of
consumption temporarily by reducing its provisions for
the future. Adequate provision must be made for
maintaining and increasing capital equipment and
reserves of overseas exchange.
New Zealand in the1950s had been investing in
capital at a rate that bore favourable comparison with
most other countries. Nevertheless, with population
increasing at the rate it had, a very large proportion of
annual investment had served merely to replace
capital wearing out and to maintain the stock of capital
at its previous level per head of population. It seemed
essential that the high ratio of investment should at least
be maintained.
Much of course depends on how selective a country
is prepared to be as between more and less productive
types of investment and consumption. New Zealand for
instance would probably have found it easier to achieve
the desired rate of growth over the years ahead with that
level of investment, if it had placed more emphasis on
investment in farming, transport facilities and efficient
manufacturing industry and less on housing and other
social capital, or if a greater proportion of expenditure
on consumption had been devoted to education, extension
work and research.
One can be somewhat more dogmatic about the
reserves of overseas exchange. At various times in the
two decades to 1956, the reserves were permitted to fall
to quite inadequate levels. The lowest ebb was in 1938
when they fell to 7½ million pounds. In 1956 they
averaged about 90 million pounds, but this was equivalent
to only about 3½ months’ overseas payments at current
prices. Bearing in mind the continued reliance on exports
of pastoral products, and the heavy dependence of
production and employment on a sustained flow of
imports, this seemed much too low for comfort.
d) The Balance between State
and Private Activity
The complaint was regularly heard in New Zealand that
an excessive proportion of the resources of the country
was taken up by the State. According to the Labour
Department’s figures for April 1955, about 105,200
people, or 13 percent of the labour force, were employed
by the central government in its various commercial and
administrative activities. Local authorities employed a
further 61,000, or 7 ½ percent of the labour force.
During the period under review, there had been some
extension of public ownership, but less than some might
originally have expected from a professedly socialist
administration. To the old state monopolies by the
Railways and Post and Telegraph services, and the
competitive public enterprises like the Government Life
and State insurance offices and the Public Trust Office,
the Labour administration added monopolies over
broadcasting, the internal airways system and workers’
compensation insurance. The Government took
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complete ownership and control of the Reserve Bank
and State Advances Corporation, nationalised the
Bank of New Zealand, took over several collieries and
the rights to all coal on private land, and intensified its
activities in the field of housing and road transport.
Moreover the State took up shares in private concerns
manufacturing wool packs, salt and coal products and
distributing petrol. The marketing of many items of
primary produce was nationalised in the early years of
the Labour regime. As mentioned above, a producer-
governmentmarketing agency took over the marketing
of dairy produce in 1947.
After 1949, there was some reversal by a National
Government of the trend towards larger public
enterprise activity. State housing and road transport
activity were curtailed and the monopoly over workers
compensation withdrawn. Attempts were made to sell
the National Airways Corporation, but these were
considerably impeded by the threat of the Opposition to
return the Airways to public ownership if and when they
were elected to office.
The National Government also showed a disposition
to pass control of state monopolies as far as possible to
independent statutory authorities. For example, a
Commission was set up to run the railways; control of
marketing was transferred to producer boards;
legislative amendments were made implying that the
Reserve Bank might be granted a degree of
independence in the control of credit and foreign
exchange. While this was expected to be beneficial in
relieving already overburdened ministers from some of
the details of administration of these concerns, it did not
relieve them from responsibility in the public mind for
the actions of their management. It also tended to
increase the difficulties of coordination of policy. There
were two main exceptions to the general trend away
from public ownership under National. A Totalisator
Agency Board was established in 1951 to harness the
propensity of New Zealanders to bet off course, which
was previously providing a very comfortable living for
illegal bookmakers. The government also decided to
participate in the Tasman Pulp and Paper Co, established
in 1954, to manufacture pulp, paper and newsprint from
the Kaingaroa State Forest.
There appeared to be much less public concern about
the extension of public enterprise than about the growth
of the proportion of gross national product taken by the
central government in taxation. This grew from about 16
percent in 1938-39 to 25% in 1955-56.
This increase was not due to increased government
expenditure on providing goods and services. This
declined in proportion to the gross national product.
The main causes were increased transfers in the form of
Social Security benefits and subsidies, and the greater
use of revenue surpluses for capital purposes. The
spectacular increases in investment, however, were
private rather than public. The proportion of gross
national product spent by the central government on
capital works was slightly lower in 1955-56 than it
was in 1938-39.
There was therefore no great increase in the
proportion of the community’s real resources taken up
by State. What happened was that the State developed
a much more extensive system of control over the
economy. It was also redistributing a higher proportion
of the national income as Social Security benefits
and subsidies.
There was no sign in 1957 that National would be
able to offer serious resistance to the trend of rising
government expenditure and higher taxation developed
under Labour, despite its expressed anxiety to do so. In
many fields, such as the development and maintenance
of capital works, and expansion of educational and
research facilities, there was a backlog of public
expenditure to be made up, if adequate provision was to
be made for future economic progress. A significant
reduction could have been made only by a partial
dismantling of the security and welfare measures built
up during the period. But National, like Labour, seemed
to have decided that any tampering with them would
be politically suicidal.
e) The Balance between Progress
and Security
Had the “welfare state” has been impeding economic
progress?
Some commentators contended that New Zealand
and other countries had been sacrificing progress for
security since the 1930s. Expansion of Social
Security monetary benefits, health services and
subsidies had led to a considerable increase in taxation.
Some argued that this would inevitably weaken the
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incentive to produce upon which economic progress
and long-term security depend. It also removed money
and resources from the more productive elements of the
private sector. While there is a certain element of truth
in these arguments, they oversimplified the problem.
For example, the government’s increased
expenditure on health services and benefits relieved
private individuals of some of the necessity that had
always existed to make provision for the sick, the aged
and the needy. Again, some economists suggested
that only a part of the Social Security expenditures
involved the direct use of resources that would
otherwise be available to the private sector. The
monetary benefits were merely transfers of income
within the private sector from taxpayers to
beneficiaries. The only “real cost” involved, they
contended, was the cost of administering the
transfers. However, they did require considerably
higher taxation, much of it levied at relatively high
marginal rates, on income. The disincentive effects of
these taxes could not be ignored.
From the point of view of businesses selling to the
New Zealand public, any deterrent effect of higher
taxation was at least partially offset by the increased
buoyancy of the market caused by the transfers. These
went predominantly to those who could be expected to
spend the bulk of the money received. There were
also direct benefits to production from the
Social Security measures that were often neglected.
For example, a better average level of health and
education, leading to an improvement in the quality
of labour and management, and fuller use than in
the past of the country’s labour force, was a
productive advantage.
Given all this, there remained an element of conflict
between the security measures and more rapid
economic progress that any country should strive to
avoid wherever possible. The conflict was obscured
to some extent in post-war New Zealand by the
effects of continuously increasing prices for New
Zealand’s exportable produce and its greatly improved
terms of trade.
Some adverse effects of the welfare measures could
be noted during the period:
Some waste of resources was involved, particularly
in the provision of free health service, to a lesser
extent as a result of food subsidies, and to an
unknown but probably considerable extent through
the inducement to wasteful expenditure and tax
avoidance induced by the higher marginal rates of
taxation used to finance increased welfare
expenditures.
There was an increasing tendency for voluntary
savings to fall short of requirements for investment,
partly because social services reduced the need for
provision against adversity and because there was
redistribution from potential savers to more
needy groups.
The government could possibly have forced the
additional “saving” required by still further increasing
taxation, especially if it were imposed on commodities
in general use. However there was a tendency to avoid
such action wherever possible in welfare states like
New Zealand. There was a political preference to
impose taxation on those with higher incomes. In New
Zealand, this involved relatively high marginal rates of
income tax. These might not only have had adverse
effects on incentives to work, save, invest and take
risks by those affected. They also encouraged some to
avoid and in some cases evade the taxation.
The political difficulty of increasing taxation meant
that resort was had to additional bank credit with
inflationary effects; or that important government or
local body works were deferred through lack of funds
or through lack of labour and resources to carry them
out; or that inadequate provision was made for other
important government activities such as higher
education and research.
In the absence of empirical studies, it was
impossible to say how far incentives to work and to
take risks were affected by the greater security
provided by welfare measures or the higher taxation
involved, but there was probably some adverse
effect involved.
It was beyond the scope of this essay to
consider whether, and if so how, these effects
might be remedied. I suggested that, especially if
external conditions changed, the value of subsidies
and of free health services, and the desirability
of universal as opposed to “means-tested” benefits,
would be among the most keenly debated issues
in politics.
ips policy paper nineteen •  23
Conclusion
Between 1938 and 1956, the people of New Zealand
were able considerably to improve their current
material standards of living, despite a fairly rapid
increase in their numbers and decline in the proportion
actively engaged in production. They also managed to
devote a large proportion of their annual income to
investment in capital works; to expand their health,
education, defence and general administrative services;
and by making provision for the payment of much more
generous monetary benefits and building up substantial
reserves of the major primary industries, to improve the
security of the individual against economic adversity.
Although a good deal of the credit for this
improvement must be put down to good management,
both public and private, it would be a mistake to minimise
the importance of very favourable external circumstances
in enabling New Zealand to enjoy these improvements.
While farm production and exports in 1955 had risen by
just over one-third since before the war, the volume of
imports had almost doubled. The ability to purchase
more imports for each unit of produce exported was
a major factor governing the extent to which the
country was able to increase factory production by
135% and the volume of goods available for use in
New Zealand by nearly 90%.
I concluded that it would be unwise to rely on the
continuation of favourable movements in the terms of
trade to maintain improved standards of living in the
future. New Zealanders had been inclined to overlook
the fact that their ability to maintain production and
standards of living in the event of the deterioration of the
terms of trade would rest heavily on their ability to
sustain the flow of imports. To do this they had to
sustain the productive capacity of exchange earning
industries and build up adequate reserves of foreign
exchange while conditions were favourable.
It was generally agreed that this had not been done
during the period surveyed. New Zealanders had also
suffered, in common with other countries, a continuous
depreciation of the domestic value of the pound
through rising prices that could not be viewed with
complacency. External factors could be largely blamed
for this, but New Zealand had added to the problem as a
result of the tendency to attempt to achieve more than
its limited resources would permit.
Perhaps the relative ease with which the country had
been able to improve standards after the Depression
had led it to neglect to some extent the factors on which
the future rate of progress would principally depend.
These factors included more efficient use of resources
in all avenues of production, (not just farming),
enterprise, good management, scientific knowledge,
quality of labour and harmony in industrial relations.
New Zealand, I argued, would do well to invest much
more heavily than it had in the higher education,
research and extension work needed to build up this
intangible capital that was becoming so increasingly
important in the modern world.
Afterword
After study in Britain in 1957, in which I concentrated
on the implications for Britain and NZ of the successful
negotiation of the Treaty establishing a European
Economic Community, I became increasingly aware of
the need for NZ to adopt policies that would promote
the efficient diversification of our export industries and
markets. As I had indicated in the foregoing text, and a
companion article on New Zealand in the World
Economy,2 this would not be achieved by a policy of
high protection of relatively inefficient industries,
especially where economies of scale were significant.
Rather we would have to expose protected producers
gradually to more international competition. A good
starting point could be our own form of regionalism
through a negotiated agreement to free trade with our
trans-Tasman neighbour. I have provided my account
of the long and difficult negotiations leading to such an
agreement in 1983 in a paper The Rocky Road to CER,
published by the IPS in 2003.3
By the time I became Chairman of the Monetary and
Economic Council in the early 1960s, I was expressing
disappointment at the relatively slow growth of
productivity per head of the labour force and at the go-
stop-go course of the economy, aggravated by
government policies that were considerably influenced
by the electoral cycle.4 I was concerned about the
“misdirection” of investment and the relatively inefficient
use of capital, shortages of skilled people, restrictive
practices and relatively high marginal rates of personal
and company taxation. Cumulatively, these factors had
reacted with one another to become important
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hindrances to growth. The reports of the Monetary and
Economic Council sought to promote public debate on
the remedies that governments and others in the
community should be considering to improve New
Zealand’s capacity for future economic and social
development.
Frank Holmes
Originally written late 1956/ early 1957. Scanned/
dictated into computer 18/11/2003. Slightly revised, with
some additional comments, early 2004.
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